Mental disorders, brain disorders, neurodevelopmental disorders: challenges for the philosophy of psychopathology after DSM-5

South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):131-144 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The publication of DSM-5 has been accompanied by a fair amount of controversy. Amongst DSM’s most vocal ‘insider’ critics has been Thomas Insel, Director of the US National Institute of Mental Health. Insel has publicly criticised DSM’s adherence to a symptom-based classification of mental disorder, and used the weight of the NIMH to back a rival research strategy aimed at a more biology-based diagnostic classification. This strategy is part of Insel’s vision of a future, more preventative psychiatry in which mental disorders are not only understood as biological disorders of the brain, but also as neurodevelopmental disorders. This paper examines the interest and merit of Insel’s views of mental and neurodevelopmental disorder for the philosophy of psychopathology, with a special focus of his neurodevelopmental model of schizophrenia. Pitman’s ‘moderate materialism’ will be used both as a philosophical lens through which to examine Insel’s position, as well as an example of a philosophical framework that may require updating and revision in the light of moves towards a neurodevelopmental conception of mental disorder

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-31

Downloads
38 (#409,607)

6 months
4 (#790,687)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Pitman
University of the Witwatersrand

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
The myth of non-reductive materialism.Jaegwon Kim - 1989 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3):31-47.
Mental Causation.John Heil & Alfred Mele - 1995 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 185 (1):105-106.
Can supervenience and "non-strict laws" save anomalous monism?Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 19--26.
The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunuty of Science.[author unknown] - 1995 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (3):84-86.

View all 6 references / Add more references