The Factual Genesis of Judgment : what is at Stake in the Husserl-Sigwart Debate
Abstract
What is the logical form of judgments, if they have one? This question remains an enigma for any transcendental approach to logical thought. The paper addresses the matter by following the debate between Edmund Husserl and Christoph Sigwart from 1890 to 1904. It shows the pivotal role that the problem of judgment played in this discussion. Since judgments were thought to be both refined mental acts and fundamental logical elements, the related issue was a thumbnail version of the broader conflict between psychology and logic. The paper argues that Husserl, far from overcoming Sigwart’s “Kantian-psychologistic” approach, ends up integrating it into the later stages of his phenomenological work; and that this approach does in fact pose an unavoidable transcendental-genetic problem for Husserl’s phenomenology of logic. The argument intends to contribute to a possible integration of the study of the factual “nature” of men within the horizon of the philosophical logic of knowledge.