Higher-Order Discrimination

In Amelie O. Rorty & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Identity, Character and Morality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. pp. 285-309 (1990)
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Abstract

This discussion treats a set of familiar social derelictions as consequences of the perversion of a universalistic moral theory in the service of an ill-considered or insufficiently examined personal agenda.The set includes racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and class elitism, among other similar pathologies, under the general heading of discrimination. The perversion of moral theory from which these derelictions arise, I argue, involves restricting its scope of application to some preferred subgroup of the moral community of human beings. The following analysis of higher-order discrimination suggests that we often select the individuals who constitute such subgroups for reasons that we ourselves would reject on moral grounds were we to examine them carefully, but that we choose instead to put our rational resources in the service of avoiding any such examination at all costs. The implication is that arguments that truncate the scope of moral theory in fact justify bestowing the gift of moral treatment on a select few who deserve it no more than the many from whom we withhold it. Therefore, it would be precipitous to conclude that universalistic moral theory can be legitimately restricted in its practical scope of application in any way at all.

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Adrian M. S. Piper
APRA Foundation, Berlin

Citations of this work

The heart of racism.J. L. A. Garcia - 1996 - Journal of Social Philosophy 27 (1):5-46.
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