Argumentation 24 (2):227-252 (2003)
AbstractThis paper challenges the view that arguments are (by definition, as it were) attempts to persuade or convince an audience to accept (or reject) a point of view by presenting reasons for (or against) that point of view. I maintain, first, that an arguer need not intend any effect beyond that of making it manifest to readers or hearers that there is a reason for doing some particular thing (e.g., for believing a certain proposition, or alternatively for rejecting it), and second that when an arguer is in fact trying to induce an effect above and beyond rendering a reason manifest, the effect intended—the use to which his or her argument is put—need not be that hearers do what the stated reasons are reasons for doing. Where the actual or intended effect of making a reason R for doing X manifest is something other than doing X, I call it an oblique—as opposed to a direct—effect of making that reason manifest. The core of the paper presents an overview or map of the main categories of effect which arguments can have, and the main sub-types within each category, calling attention to the points at which such effects can be indirect or oblique effects. The purpose of that typology is to make it clear (i) how oblique effects can come about and (ii) how important a role they can play in the conduct of argumentation.
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References found in this work
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work
Evaluating Inferences: The Nature and Role of Warrants.Robert C. Pinto - 2006 - Informal Logic 26 (3):287-317.
Reflective Argumentation: A Cognitive Function of Arguing.Michael H. G. Hoffmann - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (4):365-397.
The Importance of Belief in Argumentation: Belief, Commitment and the Effective Resolution of a Difference of Opinion.David M. Godden - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):397-414.
The Pragmatic Force of Making an Argument.Jean Goodwin & Beth Innocenti - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):669-680.
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