Self-Determination: The Ethics of Action, Volume 1

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2016)
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Abstract

Do we have control of how we act, and does it matter to morality whether we do? Thomas Pink examines this free will problem by arguing that what matters to morality is not in fact the freedom to do otherwise, but something more primitive, a basic capacity or power to determine for ourselves what we do.

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2019

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BJ1461.P56 2016

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9780199272754   9780198843078   0198843070   0199272751   9780191833205
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Thomas Pink
Kings College

Citations of this work

Agents, objects, and their powers in Suarez and Hobbes.Thomas Pink - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):3-24.

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
The logical form of action sentences.Donald Davidson - 1967 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 81--95.
The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.
Involuntary sins.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):3-31.

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