Mind and Language 26 (1):115-139 (2011)

Authors
Cecilea Mun
University of Louisville
N. Ángel Pinillos
Arizona State University
Shyam Nair
Arizona State University
Abstract
Experimental philosophers have gathered impressive evidence for the surprising conclusion that philosophers' intuitions are out of step with those of the folk. As a result, many argue that philosophers' intuitions are unreliable. Focusing on the Knobe Effect, a leading finding of experimental philosophy, we defend traditional philosophy against this conclusion. Our key premise relies on experiments we conducted which indicate that judgments of the folk elicited under higher quality cognitive or epistemic conditions are more likely to resemble those of the philosopher. We end by showing how our experimental findings can help us better understand the Knobe Effect.
Keywords Experimental Philosophy  Epistemology  Ethics
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01412.x
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.

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