Logical form and the link between premise and conclusion

Abstract

This paper challenges the idea that purely formal or syntactic concepts can, in general, supply criteria for certifying that the premisses of arguments and inferences support their conclusions. It will maintain that neither deductively valid arguments nor inductively strong arguments can, in general, be identified by their logical form. The paper will attempt to clarify the role that patterns play in appraising arguments. Using argument schemas as an example, it will try to show that the identification of patterns can facilitate appraisal even when those patterns do not supply criter ia of support.

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Fallacies.Charles Leonard Hamblin - 1970 - Newport News, Va.: Vale Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.

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