Inconsistency, Rationality and Relativism

Informal Logic 17 (2) (1995)

Abstract

In section I, I argue that the principal reason why inconsistency is a fault is that it involves having at least one false belief. In section 2, I argue that inconsistency need not be a serious epistemic fault. The argument in section 2 is based on the notion that what matters epistemically is always in the final analysis an item's effect on attaining the goal of truth. In section 3 I describe two cases in which it is best from an epistemic point of view to knowingly retain inconsistent beliefs. In section 4 my goal is to put into perspective the charge that relativism ought to be rejected because it involves one in inconsistency

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Thoroughly Relativistic Perspectives.Mark Ressler - 2012 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (1):89-112.

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