Feminist epistemology: Implications for philosophy of science

Philosophy of Science 61 (4):646-657 (1994)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This article examines the best contemporary arguments for a feminist epistemology of scientific knowledge as found in recent works by S. Harding. I argue that no feminist epistemology of science is worthy of the name, because such an epistemology fails to escape well-known vicissitudes of epistemic relativism. But feminist epistemology merits attention from philosophers of science because it is part of a larger relativist turn in the social sciences and humanities that now aims to extend its critique to science, and Harding's "standpoint feminism" is the best-developed case. She attempts to make new use of discredited philosophical ideas concerning underdetermination, Planck's Hypothesis, and the role of counterfactuals in historical studies of science



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,491

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

267 (#66,735)

6 months
16 (#107,233)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Knowledge and Social Imagery.David Bloor - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):195-199.
The division of cognitive labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.
Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change.Arthur Donovan, Larry Laudan & Rachel Laudan - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):1063-1065.
Foundations of social epistemics.Alvin I. Goldman - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):109 - 144.

View all 8 references / Add more references