Reliabilist responses to the value of knowledge problem

Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):121-135 (2009)
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Abstract

After sketching my own solution to the Value of Knowledge Problem, which argues for a deontological understanding of justification and understands the value of knowing interesting propositions by the value we place on believing as we ought to believe, I discuss Alvin Goldman's and Erik Olsson's recent attempts to explain the value of knowledge within the framework of their reliabilist epistemology.

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Christian Piller
University of York

Citations of this work

The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-47.
The value of knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
In Defence of Swamping.Julien Dutant - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):357-366.
The value of knowledge.Carter J. Adam, Pritchard Duncan & Turri John - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Value of Knowledge.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883.

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