‘Kinds of Practical Reasons: Attitude-Related Reasons and Exclusionary Reasons’

In J. A. Pinto S. Miguens (ed.), Analyses. pp. 98-105 (2006)
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I start by explaining what attitude-related reasons are and why it is plausible to assume that, at least in the domain of practical reason, there are such reasons. Then I turn to Raz’s idea that the practice of practical reasoning commits us to what he calls exclusionary reasons. Being excluded would be a third way, additional to being outweighed and being undermined, in which a reason can be defeated. I try to show that attitude-related reasons can explain the phenomena Raz appeals to equally well. Attitude-related reasons, however, are weighted against other reasons and, thus, don’t determine a third relation of defeat. On this basis, I voice some doubts about Raz’s conception of exclusionary reasons.



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Christian Piller
University of York

Citations of this work

Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.
Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law?Edmund Tweedy Flanigan - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2):159-197.

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References found in this work

Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
Decision theory and folk psychology.Philip Pettit - 1991 - In Michael Bacharach & Susan Hurley (eds.), Essays in the Foundations of Decision Theory. Blackwell. pp. 147-175.
Preference among preferences.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):377-391.
Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences.Christian Piller - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:155-182.

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