Beware of Safety

Analytic Philosophy 60 (4):01-29 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Safety, as discussed in contemporary epistemology, is a feature of true beliefs. Safe beliefs, when formed by the same method, remain true in close-by possible worlds. I argue that our beliefs being safely true serves no recognisable epistemic interest and, thus, that this notion of safety should play no role in epistemology. Epistemologists have been misled by failing to distinguish between a feature of beliefs — being safely true — and a feature of believers, namely being safe from error. The latter is central to our epistemic endeavours: we want to be able to get right answers, whatever they are, to questions of interest. I argue that we are sufficiently safe from error (in some relevant domain) by being sufficiently sensitive (to relevant distinctions).

Similar books and articles

What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You1. [REVIEW]Karen Bennett - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):766-774.
Safety is more than the antonym of risk.Sven Ove Hansson Niklas MÖller - 2006 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (4):419-432.
Knowledge without safety.Haicheng Zhao - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3261-3278.
Saving Sosa’s Safety.Mark McBride - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):637-652.
Safety, risk acceptability, and morality.James A. E. Macpherson - 2008 - Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (3):377-390.
Knowledge and Safety.Christoph Kelp - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:21-31.
The Safety Condition for Knowledge.Dani Rabinowitz - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reasoning With Safety Factor Rules.Jonas Clausen & John Cantwell - 2007 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 11 (1):55-70.
Yes, Safety is in Danger.Tomas Bogardus & Chad Marxen - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):321-334.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-08-05

Downloads
412 (#43,713)

6 months
153 (#17,259)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christian Piller
University of York

References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.

View all 38 references / Add more references