Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):755-769 (2015)

Gabriella Pigozzi
Université Paris Dauphine
Judgment aggregation studies how individual opinions on a given set of propositions can be aggregated to form a consistent group judgment on the same propositions. Despite the simplicity of the problem, seemingly natural aggregation procedures fail to return consistent collective outcomes, leading to what is now known as the doctrinal paradox. The first occurrences of the paradox were discovered in the legal realm. However, the interest of judgment aggregation is much broader and extends to political philosophy, epistemology, social choice theory, and computer science. The aim of this paper is to provide a concise survey of the discipline and to outline some of the most pressing questions and future lines of research.
Keywords Judgment aggregation  Group decisions  Logic  Voting paradoxes  Aggregation rukes  Social choice theory
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-015-9357-7
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References found in this work BETA

Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Reasons as Defaults.John Horty - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-28.

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Logic and Majority Voting.Ryo Takemura - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2):347-382.

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