Sophia 29 (1):2-30 (1990)

Charles R. Pigden
University of Otago
l. There is an antinomy in Hare's thought between Ought-Implies-Can and No-Indicatives-from-Imperatives. It cannot be resolved by drawing a distinction between implication and entailment. 2. Luther resolved this antinomy in the l6th century, but to understand his solution, we need to understand his problem. He thought the necessity of Divine foreknowledge removed contingency from human acts, thus making it impossible for sinners to do otherwise than sin. 3. Erasmus objected (on behalf of Free Will) that this violates Ought-Implies-Can which he supported with Hare-style ordinary language arguments. 4. Luther a) pointed out the antinomy and b) resolved it by undermining the prescriptivist arguments for Ought-Implies-Can. 5. We can reinforce Luther's argument with an example due to David Lewis. 6. Whatever its merits as a moral principle, Ought-Implies-Can is not a logical truth and should not be included in deontic logics. Most deontic logics, and maybe the discipline itself, should therefore be abandoned. 7. Could it be that Ought-Conversationally-Implies-Can? Yes - in some contexts. But a) even if these contexts are central to the evolution of Ought, the implication is not built into the semantics of the word; b) nor is the parallel implication built into the semantics of orders; and c) in some cases Ought conversationally implies Can, only because Ought-Implies-Can is a background moral belief. d) Points a) and b) suggest a criticism of prescriptivism - that Oughts do not entail imperatives but that the relation is one of conversational implicature. 8. If Ought-Implies-Can is treated as a moral principle, Erasmus' argument for Free Will can be revived (given his Christian assumptions). But it does not 'prove' Pelagianism as Luther supposed. A semi-Pelagian alternative is available.
Keywords R M.Hare  Matin Luther  Prescriptivism  Erasmus  Predestination  Free Will  Ought Implies Can  Pelagianism
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DOI 10.1007/BF02782712
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References found in this work BETA

On Referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.
The Fragility of Goodness.Martha Nussbaum - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):376-383.
Logic and the Basis of Ethics.Arthur Norman Prior - 1949 - London, England: Oxford University Press.
Moral Dilemmas and the Logic of Deontic Notions.Richard Routley & Val Plumwood - 1989 - In G. Priest, R. Routley & J. Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag. pp. 653--702.

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Citations of this work BETA

I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.
The Feasibility of Collectives' Actions.Holly Lawford-Smith - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):453-467.
Does 'Ought' Conversationally Implicate 'Can'?Bart Streumer - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219–228.

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