Inductive immodesty and lawlikeness

Philosophy of Science 41 (2):196-198 (1974)
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Abstract

David Lewis [2] suggests that an adequate inductive method should be immodest, i.e. recommend itself as at least as accurate as any of its rivals. On this basis he works out a solution to the intricate problem of choosing among Carnap's λ-methods. Lewis himself points out certain undesirable consequences of his solution. I will argue that the solution breaks down for a more general reason than that indicated by Lewis; like other procedures for estimating degrees of belief I am familiar with, it overlooks the component of lawlikeness of inductive situations. This is not to object to the requirement of immodesty; I only want to draw attention to certain assumptions which Lewis makes in deriving his equations and which seem to be unjustified.

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Immodest inductive methods.David Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.

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