Irony and Shame in Socratic Ethics

International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):473-488 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Socrates is both the first thoroughgoing moral philosopher and the first to employ irony as a philosophical tool. These innovative and foundational aspects of Socratic philosophy, however, lead to apparent inconsistencies and worrisome interactions. Socrates is charged with making his interlocutors look foolish, arrogant, self-serving, or ignorant. Worse still, he seems aware of these reactions. If Socrates knows his methods stir resentment, why does he continue with them? Furthermore, how should we view irony in light of Socratic ethics? I argue that Socrates uses irony and shame to bring about the desire for moral improvement. Socratic irony is of the riddling variety and the shame that it produces is not intended to belittle the interlocutor’s sense of self. Instead, shame is an appropriate response to the realization that one’s life is unexamined and possibly vicious. Therefore, the real problem with Socratic irony lies not with its use, but its failure rate.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Socratic Irony, Plato's Apology, and Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony.Paul Muench - 2009 - In Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Hermann Deuser & K. Brian Söderquist (eds.), Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook. de Gruyter. pp. 71-125.
On Being a Socratic Philosophy Instructor.Eric C. Mullis - 2009 - Teaching Philosophy 32 (4):345-359.
Kierkegaard on Mastered Irony.Brad Frazier - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):465-479.
Kierkegaard's Socratic Task.Paul Muench - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
The irony of Heidegger: an essay.Andrew Haas - 2007 - New York: Continuum.
Love as a Problem of Knowledge in Kierkegaard's Either/Or and Plato's Symposium.Ulrika Carlsson - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):41-67.
The concept of irony: with constant reference to Socrates.Søren Kierkegaard - 1966 - New York: Octagon Books. Edited by Lee M. Capel.
Kierkegaard on the Problems of Pure Irony.Brad Frazier - 2004 - Journal of Religious Ethics 32 (3):417 - 447.
Kierkegaard's Socratic Point of View.Paul Muench - 2006; rev. 2009 - In Sara Ahbel-Rappe & Rachana Kamtekar (eds.), Kierkegaardiana. Blackwell.
Morals and Their Ironies.Ruth L. Smith - 1998 - Journal of Religious Ethics 26 (2):367 - 388.
Kierkegaard's Early and Later View of Socratic Irony.Winfield E. Nagley - 1980 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 55 (3):271-282.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
100 (#167,981)

6 months
9 (#250,037)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Julie Piering
Northern Arizona University

Citations of this work

Socratic Irony and Argumentation.Timo Airaksinen - 2021 - Argumentation 36 (1):85-100.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references