In Carlo Nicolai & Johannes Stern (eds.), Modes of Truth. Routledge (2021)

Authors
Lavinia Maria Picollo
University College London
Thomas Schindler
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
What requirements must deflationary formal theories of truth satisfy? This chapter argues against the widely accepted view that compositional and Tarskian theories of truth are substantial or otherwise unacceptable to deflationists. First, two purposes that a formal truth theory can serve are distinguished: one descriptive, the other logical (i.e., to characterise the correctness of inferences involving ‘true’). The chapter argues that the most compelling arguments for the incompatibility of compositional and Tarskian theories concern descriptive theories only. Second, two requirements that any deflationist truth theory intended to serve a logical purpose must satisfy are put forward. These requirements, it is argued, suggest that (i) many well-known compositional and Tarskian theories are acceptable from a deflationist standpoint (including CT); (ii) certain other popular theories of truth (including KF and FS) are not similarly acceptable; (iii) there are no conclusive reasons to impose a conservativeness requirement on deflationary theories of truth.
Keywords truth  deflationism
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophy of Logic.W. V. O. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages.Alfred Tarski - 1936 - In A. Tarski (ed.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford University Press. pp. 152--278.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deflationism About Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb, Daniel Stoljar & James Woodbridge - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Higher-Order Logic and Disquotational Truth.Lavinia Picollo & Thomas Schindler - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-40.

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