Erkenntnis (5):1-30 (2017)

Authors
Lavinia Maria Picollo
University College London
Thomas Schindler
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called ‘infinite conjunctions’. Several authors claim that the truth predicate can serve this function only if it is fully disquotational, which leads to triviality in classical logic. As a consequence, many have concluded that classical logic should be rejected. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we consider two accounts available in the literature of what it means to express infinite conjunctions with a truth predicate and argue that they fail to support the necessity of transparency for that purpose. Second, we show that, with the aid of some regimentation, many expressive functions of the truth predicate can actually be performed using truth principles that are consistent in classical logic. Finally, we suggest a reconceptualisation of deflationism, according to which the principles that govern the use of the truth predicate in natural language are largely irrelevant for the question of what formal theory of truth we should adopt. Many philosophers think that the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationists; we will argue, on the contrary, that deflationists are in a much better position to deal with the paradoxes than their opponents.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-017-9919-x
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophy of Logic.W. V. O. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Oxford University Press.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Meaning and the Moral Sciences.Hilary Putnam - 1978 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deflationism and the Function of Truth.Lavinia Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):326-351.
Conservative Deflationism?Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):535-549.
Paradoxical Desires.Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):335-355.

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