Abstract

A dominant belief in political philosophy is that states must be entitled to authorize the use of coercion in order to justifiably coerce its subjects. Call this view the entitlement view. On this view, for a state to justifiably coerce its subjects, a necessary condition is that it is entitled to authorize the use of coercion. Sceptics hold the entitlement view. However, they deny that states are entitled to authorize the use of coercion. This denial informs their views regarding the permissible use of political power. Skeptics believe that nearly all uses of political power is impermissible. In this paper, I present a challenge to the skeptical view that nearly all uses of political power is impermissible. I also present a view on the justification of certain uses of political power that is an alternate to the entitlement view. My alternate view allows me to demonstrate that a state can engage in permissible uses of political power over a broad range of domains without possessing any entitlements.