Moralism and the good

Philosophical Studies 52 (1):131 - 139 (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It is often held that moral considerations take precedence over considerations of other kinds in determining what we ought to do. I contend that this claim is ambiguous and argue that objections to each interpretation of it can be met only by rejecting the other. One surprising consequence of my argument is that no deontic moral theory can effectively guide action unless it is conjoined with a theory of the good. Another interesting consequence is that the deontologists' favorite objection to teleological theories — the objection from injustice — does not go through.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,283

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Virtue ethics, theory, and warrant.Garrett Cullity - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):277-294.
Why emotivists love inconsistency.Gunnar Björnsson - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (1):81 - 108.
Conceptual closure in Anselm's proof: reply to Tony Roark.Gyula Klima - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):131-134.
Grounding Moralism: Moral Flaws and Aesthetic Properties.Aaron Smuts - 2011 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 45 (4):34-53.


Added to PP

48 (#333,377)

6 months
1 (#1,478,456)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references