Is Kant's practical reason practical?

Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (2):95-108 (1981)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is a tension between theory and practice in kant's moral philosophy. On the one hand, The categorical imperative presupposes that no rational agent is intrinsically deserving of more rights or a better life than any other. On the other hand, The categorical imperative requires that we act in certain other regarding ways regardless of how others act in relation to us. I argue that often we cannot act in accordance with this latter practical principle without violating the theoretical egalitarianism it presupposes. And I suggest that this sort of conflict may be characteristic of many moral philosophies in the liberal tradition

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,323

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics.Immanuel Kant - 1909 - New York: Barnes & Noble. Edited by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott.
Kant's account of nature's systematicity and the unity of theoretical and practical reason.Lara Ostaric - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):155 – 178.
Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason.Patrick Kain - 2010 - In Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb & James Krueger (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality. de Gruyter. pp. 211--230.
Formal principles and the form of a law.Andrews Reath - 2010 - In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
36 (#446,570)

6 months
5 (#648,315)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Kant's moral philosophy.Robert N. Johnson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Rationality, Responsibility and Blame.Michael Philips - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):141 - 154.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references