Intuition et lois logiques

Philosophiques 44 (1):73-83 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

PATRICE PHILIE | : Cet article a pour objectif d’examiner le rôle des intuitions dans le cadre du problème de la justification des lois logiques de base. Une revue des différentes conceptions de l’intuition permet de mettre les choses en place et d’identifier la conception qui convient le mieux au problème — c’est une conception modale qui sera retenue. Je soumettrai ensuite cette conception à un examen critique, lequel se fera en deux temps. D’une part, il s’agira de montrer la difficulté d’en arriver à une formulation plausible de la conception modale. Je soulèverai d’autre part certains problèmes qui surgissent, même si l’on fait le pari que la question de la formulation peut être résolue. En définitive, je soutiens que, lorsqu’il s’agit d’utiliser les intuitions comme fondement de la connaissance des lois logiques de base, nous devons adopter une conception modale, laquelle n’est pas en mesure de remplir son rôle. Le recours aux intuitions est donc voué à l’échec en épistémologie de la logique. | : This article examines the role of intuitions as they pertain to the problem of the justification of basic logical laws. To begin with, a review of the various conceptions of the nature of intuitions is made in order to set things up and to identify the conception that is most appropriate to the problem at hand — it will be shown that a modal conception is required. I will then examine this conception and submit it to a two-pronged criticism. Firstly, I will raise important difficulties when it comes to formulate a plausible account of the modal conception. Secondly, I will attempt to establish that even if the formulation problem were to be overcome, there is still a whole battery of difficulties facing the modal conception. In sum, I hold that when it comes to using intuitions as the foundation of our knowledge of basic logical laws, we have no choice but to embrace a modal conception — and the latter is unable to deliver its promises. Hence, the appeal to intuitions is bound to fail in the epistemology of logic.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Intuition and Modal Error.George Bealer - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.
The Ontology of Propositions in Husserl's Prolegomena.Genki Uemura - 2010 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique (9).
Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.
Ignorance Radicalized.Gergo Somodi - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):140-156.
Can modal intuitions be evidence for essentialist claims?Janet Levin - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):253 – 269.
Intuitions in the Face of Diversity.James Andow - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Nottingham
Evidence and intuition.Yuri Cath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):311-328.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-07-13

Downloads
26 (#595,031)

6 months
10 (#251,846)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Patrice Philie
University of Ottawa

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
A counterexample to modus ponens.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.
A priori knowledge and the scope of philosophy.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?Kurt Gödel - 1947 - The American Mathematical Monthly 54 (9):515--525.
The incoherence of empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.

View all 10 references / Add more references