Approximate syllogisms – on the logic of everyday life

Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (2-3):227-234 (1999)
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Abstract

Since Aristotle it is recognised that a valid syllogism cannot have two particular premises. However, that is not how a lay person sees it; at least as long as the premises read many, most etc, instead of a plain some. The lay people are right if one considers that these syllogisms do not have strict but approximate (Zadeh) validity. Typically there are only particular premises available in everyday life and one is dependent on such syllogisms. – Some rules on the usage of particular premises are given below.

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Citations of this work

Legal concepts as inferential nodes and ontological categories.Giovanni Sartor - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (3):217-251.

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References found in this work

Fuzzy logic and approximate reasoning.L. A. Zadeh - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):407-428.
Juristische Rhetorik.F. Haft - 1980 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 42 (1):182-183.

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