Abstract
Something is called true because it conforms to some measure. Since what measures is logically prior to what it measures, the latter is always secondarily speaking true. Further, what is secondarily speaking true pictures its measure. In all there are six types of such picturing. Since “true” is inherently referential and the latter is the mark of mind, truth is properly speaking mind-dependent. Besides, truth has the same status as falsity, and falsity is mind-dependent. That implies that the measures in truth are mind-dependent. That mind is either human or divine. All mind-independent things are improperly speaking true. They are called true only because they bear some relation to what is strictly speaking true. But not all that is secondarily speaking true is improperly speaking true. Judgments are secondarily speaking true since they are measured by facts but are nonetheless properly speaking true. A nominalist alternative to this assay is traced to Aristotle. It is too narrow to catch all types of truth. A conceptualist analysis implicates its defenders in a dilemma in which what they say is either false or contradictory
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0019-0365
DOI 10.5840/ipq200444165
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