Pooling, Products, and Priors

Abstract

We often learn the opinions of others without hearing the evidence on which they're based. The orthodox Bayesian response is to treat the reported opinion as evidence itself and update on it by conditionalizing. But sometimes this isn't feasible. In these situations, a simpler way of combining one's existing opinion with opinions reported by others would be useful, especially if it yields the same results as conditionalization. We will show that one method---upco, also known as multiplicative pooling---is specially suited to this role when the opinions you wish to pool concern hypotheses about chances. The result has interesting consequences: it addresses the problem of disagreement between experts; and it sheds light on the social argument for the uniqueness thesis.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Geometric Pooling: A User's Guide.Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Opinion Pooling.Lee Elkin & Richard Pettigrew - 2025 - Cambridge University Press. Edited by Richard Pettigrew.
Support for Geometric Pooling.Jean Baccelli & Rush T. Stewart - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (1):298-337.
Jeffrey Pooling.Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock, The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation.Lee Elkin - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (16):473-495.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-02-27

Downloads
687 (#44,254)

6 months
127 (#51,187)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Richard Pettigrew
University of Bristol
Jonathan Weisberg
University of Toronto, Mississauga

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Two mistakes about credence and chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb, Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 8 references / Add more references