Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):165-175 (2015)

A large part of the current debate among virtue ethicists focuses on the role played by phronesis, or wise practical reasoning, in virtuous action. The paradigmatic case of an action expressing phronesis is one where an agent explicitly reflects and deliberates on all practical options in a given situation and eventually makes a wise choice. Habitual actions, by contrast, are typically performed automatically, that is, in the absence of preceding deliberation. Thus they would seem to fall outside of the primary focus of the current virtue ethical debate. By contrast, Bill Pollard has recently suggested that all properly virtuous actions must be performed habitually and therefore automatically, i.e. in the absence of moral deliberation. In this paper, Pollard’s suggestion is interpreted as the thesis that habitual automaticity is constitutive of virtue or moral excellence. By constructing an argument in favor of it and discussing several objections, the paper ultimately seeks to defend a qualified version of this thesis
Keywords Virtue  Habit  Automaticity  Moral deliberation
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-014-9516-x
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References found in this work BETA

On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Intelligent Virtue.Julia Annas - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.

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Non-Ideal Virtue and Situationism.Matthew C. Taylor - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):41-68.

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