Microphysicalism, dottism, and reduction

Analysis 55 (3):141-46 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/analys/55.3.141

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,122

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Reply to Pettit.Tim Crane - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):224-27.
On Crane and Mellor's argument against physicalism.Daniel N. Robinson - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):135-36.
A definition of physicalism.Philip Pettit - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):213-23.
There is No Question of Physicalism.Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):185-206.
Supervenience, by chance? Reply to Crane and Mellor.Angus Menuge - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):228-235.
Does physicalism need fixing?Chris Daly - 1995 - Analysis 55 (3):135-41.
Microphysicalism without contingent micro-macro laws.Philip Pettit - 1994 - Analysis 54 (4):253-57.
Dualism, Monism, Physicalism.Tim Crane - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85.
Physicalism lives.Robert Kirk - 1996 - Ratio 9 (1):85-89.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
85 (#187,631)

6 months
1 (#1,241,711)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Philip Pettit
Australian National University

Citations of this work

How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be?Jessica Wilson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):33-52.
On characterizing the physical.Jessica Wilson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.
Looks as powers.Philip Pettit - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references