Abstract

Among the approaches to philosophical questions developed this century, no two have been assumed to be more antagonistic than the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and the linguistic philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The result of this purported abyss is that both of these predominant schools tend to ignore the viable conclusions of the other, and each approach often regards the other as engaging in investigations which are not philosophical. It is the purpose of this dissertation to show that what is essential to the views of these two schools is not irreconcilable, but reflects a common understanding of philosophical problems, and of the means for their resolution. ;This is accomplished by demonstrating that both Husserl and Wittgenstein primarily focus on the relations between our experiences of the world and their expression. This involves an exegesis of the mutual thesis that philosophy is the pure description of these relations. A comparison then follows of their positions on such topics as: description versus explanation, philosophical versus scientific investigations, transcendental versus grammatical inquiry, the nature of language, verification of philosophical descriptions, and the significance for each of what Husserl calls the "Lebenswelt" and Wittgenstein calls "Lebensformen". This reveals that, although there are differences between Husserl and Wittgenstein, these are not so fundamental as to conceal their congruence on the subject and procedure of philosophical inquiry. ;It is then shown how some of these differences can serve as indices for overcoming the limitations intrinsic to each of their philosophies. From this is developed a grammatical-transcendental approach to philosophy which, though it draws from Husserl and Wittgenstein, is neither a mere variant of either philosophy, nor subject to the problems peculiar to each. The salient consequence of the construction of this model is that it makes evident that the philosophies of Husserl and Wittgenstein are not essentially antithetical, but supplement and correct each other. Furthermore, it should not only secure a basis for meaningful dialogue between phenomenologists and linguistic philosophers, but also provide an effective means for confronting philosophical problems in particular and the inquiries of the social sciences in general.