The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):257-264 (2019)

Authors
Derk Pereboom
Cornell University
Abstract
Contrary to what I have contended, Michael McKenna argues that basic desert does not have an essential role in the free will debate. On his alternative construal, what is central is whether our practice of holding morally responsible, and blaming in particular, can be justified, and what notion of free will is required for that justification. Notions distinct from basic desert can ground our practice, and so the free will debate is independent of basic desert. Here I argue that the one best candidate for such a notion is basic fairness, but in the area of moral responsibility there is no substantial difference between basic desert and basic fairness.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10892-019-09291-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,587
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Gary Watson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (9):517-522.
Moral Blame and Moral Protest.Angela Smith - 2013 - In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Tension in Critical Compatibilism.Robert H. Wallace - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):321-332.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert.Michael McKenna - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):241-255.
Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):489-511.
Hard Incompatibilism and its Rivals.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.
Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.
Précis of Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Gregg Caruso - 2014 - Science, Religion and Culture 1 (3):178-201.
Merit, Fit, and Basic Desert.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press USA.
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-06-11

Total views
37 ( #296,720 of 2,461,918 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #223,013 of 2,461,918 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes