Structuralism, Anti-Structuralism and Objectivity

Philosophic Exchange 40 (1) (2010)
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Abstract

Structuralist theories describe the entities in their domains solely in terms of relations, while also claiming to be complete theories of the entities in question. Leibniz and Kant insist that no structuralist theory can be a complete theory. Kant believes that the knowledge afforded by structuralist theories is sufficient. However, Jacques Derrida is skeptical of the sufficiency of structuralist theories for stable knowledge of any kind.

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Derk Pereboom
Cornell University

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