Representationalism and the problem of vagueness

Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86 (2013)
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This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism


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Author Profiles

Tim Bayne
Monash University
Ryan Perkins
Franciscan University of Steubenville

Citations of this work

Post-perceptual confidence and supervaluative matching profile.Tony Cheng - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):249-277.
Is Consciousness Vague?Geoffrey Hall - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):670-684.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - New York: Routledge.

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