Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86 (2013)

Authors
Tim Bayne
Monash University
Ryan Perkins
Oxford University
Abstract
This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism
Keywords representationalism  perception  intentionalism  content  perceptual content  naive realism  disjunctivism  contents of perception  vagueness  supervaluationism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9990-8
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is Consciousness Vague?Geoffrey Hall - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Post-Perceptual Confidence and Supervaluative Matching Profile.Tony Cheng - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):249-277.
Representationalism About Consciousness.Adam Pautz - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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Appearance and Illusion.James Genone - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):339-376.
Strong Representationalism and Centered Content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.

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