Compatibilist Options

In M. O'Rourke J. K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT Press. pp. 231 (2004)
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Abstract

…those who accept that responsibility for a situation implies an ability to bring it about and, perhaps, an ability to prevent it, must explain how agents are able to do other than they are caused to do. Without it, they can give no defense of their counterexamples. With it, they can be confident that.

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John Perry
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
(In)compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2023 - In Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will. Wiley. pp. 58-83.
Dispositional Abilities.Ann Whittle - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.
Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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