Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529 (2019)
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Abstract |
Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
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Keywords | Epistemic Value Value of Truth Richard Feldman |
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DOI | 10.1007/s12136-019-00382-4 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.William P. Alston - 2005 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
A Puzzle About Epistemic Value and Steps Towards a Solution.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12103-12119.
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2019-02-20
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