Enharrisment: a Reply to John Harris about Moral Enhancement

Neuroethics 9 (3):275-277 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his reply to our response to his book How to be Good, John Harris accuses us of saying ‘two mutually contradictory things’ when in fact we talk about two different things. In this short response, we distinguish between moral enhancement and interventions which promote moral behaviour but undermine freedom. We argue that moral enhancement does not necessarily undermine freedom. Interventions, such as the God Machine, which do undermine freedom are not moral enhancements as we conceive of them. But they might nonetheless be justified because freedom must be balanced against other values, such as well-being.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Freedom and moral enhancement.Michael J. Selgelid - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (4):215-216.
Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-at-any-cost bias.Vojin Rakić - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (4):246-250.
How to Be Good: The Possibility of Moral Enhancement.John Harris - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
... How Narrow the Strait!John Harris - 2014 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 23 (3):247-260.
Moral enhancement and freedom.John Harris - 2010 - Bioethics 25 (2):102-111.
The perils of moral enhancement.Aleksandar Dobrijevic - 2012 - Filozofija I Društvo 23 (2):104-110.
The myth of the moral enhancement: Back to the future?Veselin Mitrovic - 2012 - Filozofija I Društvo 23 (2):111-123.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-08-05

Downloads
66 (#237,149)

6 months
11 (#196,102)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Julian Savulescu
Oxford University
Ingmar Persson
Oxford University