A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision

Theory and Decision 67 (2):163-222 (2009)
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Abstract

In the literature there are at least two models for probabilistic belief revision: Bayesian updating and imaging [Lewis, D. K. (1973), Counterfactuals, Blackwell, Oxford; Gärdenfors, P. (1988), Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. In this paper we focus on imaging rules that can be described by the following procedure: (1) Identify every state with some real valued vector of characteristics, and accordingly identify every probabilistic belief with an expected vector of characteristics; (2) For every initial belief and every piece of information, choose the revised belief which is compatible with this information and for which the expected vector of characteristics has minimal Euclidean distance to the expected vector of characteristics of the initial belief. This class of rules thus satisfies an intuitive notion of minimal belief revision. The main result in this paper is to provide an axiomatic characterization of this class of imaging rules

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Andrés Perea
Maastricht University

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

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