The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):287 - 306 (2008)

Authors
Derk Pereboom
Cornell University
Abstract
A traditional concern for determinists is that the epistemic conditions an agent must satisfy to deliberate about which of a number of distinct actions to perform threaten to conflict with a belief in determinism and its evident consequences. I develop an account of the sort that specifies two epistemic requirements, an epistemic openness condition and a belief in the efficacy of deliberation, whose upshot is that someone who believes in determinism and its evident consequences can deliberate without inconsistent beliefs. I argue that conditions of both types are indispensable, and that they can be formulated so as to withstand the relevant objections
Keywords Deliberation  Determinism  Incompatibilism  Compatibilism  Openness  Deliberative efficacy
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DOI 10.1007/s10892-008-9036-9
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References found in this work BETA

Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.
Hard Incompatibilism and its Rivals.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.
Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2033-2054.
Sceptical Deliberations.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):383-408.
Against Deliberation Restrictions.Garrett Pendergraft - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (3):341-357.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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