Abstract

Kantian moral humanism refers to Kant’s ingenious effort to conceive human beings as bearers of an intrinsic and non-negotiable value that is grounded on the fact that they are autonomous lawgivers in a kingdom of ends. However, the highly idealised character of his project and its metaphysical underpinnings render the association between man’s inner worth and autonomy problematic for the modern reader. In this essay we argue for a more down to earth moral humanism that still supports the above association but through an alternative route. In our “moral image” introspection, interaction, and sympathy, conceived as a primitive emotion that motivates us to care for the good of other people, play a central grounding role. However, while we are now more certain about the soundness of the general moral framework concerning the justification of the inherent value of human beings, we are less confident about the obligations it generates. This is the price we pay as we descend from Kant’s orderly moral heaven to the messy reality of human affairs.