Abstract

In his recent book 'Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity,' Alasdair MacIntyre argues that expressivist metaethics invalidates NeoAristotelian first-order moral theory. In this paper, I will challenge this claim by developing an expressivist reading of NeoAristotelian first-order theory that is inspired by Harry Frankfurt. I will then show how this reading is able to make sense of the moral transformations that MacIntyre thinks are only intelligible within a NeoAristotelian metaethical framework. Specifically, I will focus on the transformation of desire under the tutelage of one’s elders, and the acquisition of sociological self-awareness through shared deliberation with one’s friends. While MacIntyre offers an interesting NeoAristotelian account of these moral transformations, he has failed to show how these transformations are invalidated by expressivism.