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Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem
Studia Logica 89 (3):333-341 (2008)
Abstract
We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
The Consistency of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson.Frederik Herzberg - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (3):331-345.
The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (3):347-353.
The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism: inferential justification versus holism and coherence.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):701-723.
Probabilistic Regresses and the Availability Problem for Infinitism.Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):211-220.
Foundationalism with infinite regresses of probabilistic support.William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3899-3917.
References found in this work
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
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