Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Philosophical Studies 173 (2):395-416 (2016)
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Abstract

In the epistemology of testimony it is often assumed that audiences are able to reliably recover asserted contents. In the philosophy of language this claim is contentious. This paper outlines one problem concerning the recovery of asserted contents, and argues that it prevents audiences from gaining testimonial knowledge in a range of cases. The recovery problem, in essence, is simply that due to the collective epistemic limitations of the speaker and audience speakers will, in certain cases, be insensitive to the ways in which they may be misinterpreted. As a result audiences’ beliefs will often fail the safety and sensitivity conditions on knowledge. Once the problem has been outlined and distinguished from several related problems in the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony, a series of responses are considered. The first response holds that audiences possess defeaters in recovery problem cases, and thus wouldn’t form beliefs. The second response holds that the beliefs audiences form are very coarse grained, meaning they are not very vulnerable to failures of safety and sensitivity. The final response holds that the objects of speaker meaning are not propositional. All three responses are found to be unsatisfactory

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Andrew Peet
Umeå University

Citations of this work

Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.
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Narrative testimony.Rachel Fraser - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4025-4052.
Do we hear meanings? – between perception and cognition.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):196-228.

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References found in this work

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Literal Meaning.François Récanati - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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