Rational Persons and Ethical Practices: Alasdair Macintyre's Project in Moral Philosophy
Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (
1993)
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Abstract
Alasdair MacIntyre's recent project in moral philosophy has focused on the nature of social practices, operating within a given tradition, as these provide an identity for individuals and guide their conduct. These practices give rise to a series of roles and characters which are assumed, in various combinations, by each participant in a specific practice. When disciplined and directed by a network of virtues, adoption of these roles allows the individual practitioner to pursue the internal goods of a particular practice, which are normally expressed as the excellences acquired in the carrying out of the practice. ;My argument against MacIntyre is that he has misconstrued the notion of a social practice, so that it cannot serve as the grounding for his ethical project. In particular, his distinction between internal and external goods cannot be sustained, which renders incoherent his understanding of how practices are expressed through their excellences. I demonstrate this by examining a contemporary social practice, that of investment banking. I show that this practice, particularly as it was carried out by Michael Milken in the domain of corporate bond trading, meets all the criteria established by MacIntyre for a secure social practice, yet leaves this activity without any internal basis for criticism and correction. ;My claim is that MacIntyre's project cannot be maintained unless he admits some unique contribution by the individual subject within a practice, a contribution which resembles the rational exercise of a techne, as understood within the Platonic tradition. Working through the relevant texts, I show that techne, as portrayed by Plato, is a form of rational activity that is internal to the subject, and is used to guide the conduct of various crafts, including the craft of rational public discourse. When such a notion of techne is attached to MacIntyre's concept of social practices, it is possible to account for the ways in which practices progress, the goods of a practice are appropriated by the individual practitioner, and criticism and correction of a practice can occur