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Rationale and maxims in the study of concepts
Noûs 39 (1):167-78 (2005)
Abstract
Is there any good reason for thinking that a concept is individuated by the condition for a thinker to possess it? Why is that approach superior to alternative accounts of the individuation of concepts? These are amongst the fundamental questions raised by Wayne Davis.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
The ontology of concepts: Abstract objects or mental representations?Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):561-593.
Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.
The Empirical Case Against Analyticity: Two Options for Concept Pragmatists.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):199-227.
References found in this work
Implicit conceptions, understanding and rationality.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:43-88.
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