Arnauld's Verbal Distinction between Ideas and Perceptions

History and Philosophy of Logic 37 (4):375-390 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his dispute with Malebranche about the nature of ideas, Arnauld endorses a form of direct realism. This appears to conflict with views put forward by Arnauld and his collaborators in the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic where ideas are treated as objects in the mind. This tension can be resolved by a careful examination of Arnauld's remarks on the semantics of ‘perception’ and ‘idea’ in light of the Port-Royal theory of language. This examination leads to the conclusion that Arnauld's ideas really are objects in the mind, and not perceptual acts as many commentators hold. What Arnauld denies is that these mental objects are really distinct from the external objects they represent. Instead, Arnauld holds that, by the act of conception, the external objects themselves—not copies—come to be present in the mind and are therefore called ‘ideas’.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,391

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-09-02

Downloads
92 (#135,684)

6 months
6 (#133,567)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kenneth L. Pearce
James Madison University

Citations of this work

Locke, Arnauld, and Abstract Ideas.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (1):75-94.
Ideas and Explanation in Early Modern Philosophy.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (2):252-280.

Add more citations