Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (5):573-592 (2015)

Gillman Payette
University of British Columbia
In this paper we look at two classic methods of deriving consequences from inconsistent premises: Rescher-Manor and Schotch-Jennings. The overall goal of the project is to confine the method of drawing consequences from inconsistent sets to those that do not require reference to any information outside of very general facts about the set of premises. Methods in belief revision often require imposing assumptions on premises, e.g., which are the important premises, how the premises relate in non-logical ways. Such assumptions enable one to select a reasonable collection of formulas from all the formulas of the language. Basic versions of the classic methods only use logical relations between the premises. We compare and criticize each of the classic views with an eye to combining the views to get the most out of inconsistent premises. We do this in a way that will respect the theoretical grounding of each view while meeting our other restrictions
Keywords Paraconsistency  Consequence relations  Rescher-Manor  Schotch-Jennings
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-014-9343-5
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References found in this work BETA

On Inferences From Inconsistent Premises.Nicholas Rescher & Ruth Manor - 1970 - Theory and Decision 1 (2):179-217, 1970-1971.
Inference and Necessity.P. K. Schotch & R. E. Jennings - 1980 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (3):327-340.

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