Abstract

According to Kant's famous aphorism, even a nation of devils can solve the problem of establishing a state, if only the devils are able to act prudentially. Therefore, Kant holds that the threat and application of coercion by a liberal legal order can even motivate people who are exclusively interested in maximizing their own profit to obey the law. The present essay examines the consistency of this idea. After a short introduction , the essay points out that Kant conceives of law in terms of coercion . Nonetheless, the philosopher's considerations on preventive coercion - coercion as a hindrance of a hindrance of freedom - as well as his understanding of punishment - coercion as retribution for a crime - presuppose that most members of the community accept the law voluntarily . Indeed, a liberal legal order is unable to survive in the long run without intrinsic loyalty of the majority of its citizens. Contrary to Hegel, Kant does not have the analytic categories at his disposal to adequately take into account this indispensable though unenforceable prerequisite of a legal system's stability. Regrettably, Kant's practical philosophy does not delve into specific political morality as his Doctrine of Virtue does with personal morality