The Hard Core of the Mind-Body Problem: Essays on Sensory Consciousness and the Secondary Qualities

Dissertation, New York University (2004)
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Abstract

The mind-body problem is one of the last great intellectual mysteries facing humankind. The hard core of the mind-body problem is the problem of qualitative character: the what-it's-likeness of conscious states. What is the nature of qualitative character? Can it be explained in terms of the intentional content of experience? What is the nature of the so-called secondary qualities---colors, sounds, smells, and so on? Finally, is Physicalism about qualitative character correct? In other words, are a person's qualitative mental properties determined, as a matter of 'strict' or 'metaphysical' necessity, by her physical and functional properties? ;My dissertation is a collection of essays that address these questions. They are self-standing but interrelated. Collectively, they develop a case for skepticism concerning Physicalism about qualitative mental properties. It is common to argue against Physicalism on a priori grounds: that it is shown to be false by the conceivability of Zombies, that it is incompatible with the 'explanatory gap', that it falls victim to Frank Jackson's Mary argument, and so on. The argument I develop does not rely on the usual a priori considerations. The structure of the argument is simple. In the first essay I argue that in the case of qualitative mental properties the only form of Physicalism which we have reason to accept is what I call 'Identity Physicalism': roughly, the view that qualitative mental properties are identical with physical or functional properties. If it can be shown to be false, we have no reason to accept the Physicalist's modally very strong claim that there is a metaphysically necessary connection between a person's qualitative mental properties, on the one hand, and her physical-functional properties, on the other. In the remaining essays, I use empirical considerations to argue that Identity Physicalism is false in the case of qualitative mental properties. The result is a skeptical position with regard to Physicalism. ;But the dissertation is not entirely negative. Along the way to arguing for this negative conclusion, I develop a package of positive views which are largely independent of it

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Adam Pautz
Brown University

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