- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45 (2003)
Abstract
I argue that Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) have not answered Hardin's objection to physicalism about color concerning the unitary-binary structure of the colors for two reasons. First, their account of unitary-binary structure seems unsatisfactory. Second, pace B&H, there are no physicalistically acceptable candidates to be the hue-magnitudes. I conclude with a question about the justification of physicalism about color.Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
It's not easy being green : Hardin and color relationalism.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press.
Byrne and Hilbert's chromatic ether.C. L. Hardin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):32-33.
Color for Philosophers.C. L. Hardin & David R. Hilbert - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):83-85.
On (Not) Believing That God Has Answered a Prayer.Brian Embry - 2017 - Faith and Philosophy (1):132-141.
Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow. [REVIEW]Edward Wilson Averill - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (3):459-463.
Introduction.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.
David Hilbert, Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism Reviewed by.C. L. Hardin - 1989 - Philosophy in Review 9 (2):47-49.
Do we see more than we can access?Alex Byrne, David Hilbert & Susanna Siegel - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (5-6):501-502.
Justifying induction mathematically: Strategies and functions.Alexander Paseau - 2008 - Logique Et Analyse 51 (203):263.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
158 (#117,284)
6 months
9 (#290,637)
2009-01-28
Downloads
158 (#117,284)
6 months
9 (#290,637)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Can disjunctivists explain our access to the sensible world?Adam Pautz - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):384-433.
Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.
Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?1.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
Perceptual Variation, Color Language, and Reference Fixing. An Objectivist Account.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):3-40.
Colour in a Physical World: A Problem due to Visual Noise.John Morrison - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):333-373.
References found in this work
Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-7c76586df8-pp8v9 uwo