A Common-Sense Theory of Self-Knowledge
Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (
1991)
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Abstract
In this dissertation I provide a theoretical ground for a common-sense theory of self-knowledge. My basic contention is that sometimes observers are better judges of our own mental states than we are. I also maintain that we have access to our mental states that others do not, and this provides for limited privileged access. ;This basic contention is, I believe, consistent with the beliefs of most people. But it has not been popular in the history of philosophy. Thus I devote a great deal of time to the criticism of two opposing views. The first view I call "Cartesian." Descartes was the father of this account of self-knowledge, and it has been very influential. The "Cartesian" holds that we are always the best judge of our own mental states and that we cannot be wrong in our assessments concerning what is going on in our own "minds." Such a view relies on a dualist metaphysics of mind and body. I argue that this dualism is unacceptable. I then go on to argue that the corresponding epistemology must therefore fail. ;My opponent on the other side is the "Behaviorist." Gilbert Ryle represents this view. He holds that others are almost always the best judges of our motives and other mental states. Much of his positive account of self-knowledge grows out of a criticism of the Cartesian. He rejects dualism and comes to an understanding of psychological statements as hypothetical statements about overt behavior. This, I believe, is an over-correction of the Cartesian and leads to an equally unacceptable epistemology. ;Thus my own view lies somewhere between Cartesianism and Behaviorism. I hold that sometimes we are in the best position to know what we feel, believe, or intend, and that we have some access to these mental states that others do not. But at the same time I argue that others can still have access to our mental states through our actions and intelligent speech