Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation

Ratio Juris 31 (3):260-275 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Theoretical Disagreement and the Semantic Sting.Dale Smith - 2010 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (4):635-661.
The autonomy of law: essays on legal positivism.Robert P. George (ed.) - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Legal positivism.Mario Jori (ed.) - 1992 - New York, NY: New York University Press.
The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism.Robert P. George (ed.) - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-11

Downloads
35 (#438,385)

6 months
10 (#235,055)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dennis Patterson
University of Surrey

References found in this work

Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Ethics 90 (1):121-130.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Mind 88 (350):305-309.
The Concept of Law.Stuart M. Brown - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (2):250.

View all 17 references / Add more references