Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (2):219-226 (1989)

ABSTRACT In Respect for Nature Paul W. Taylor argues that there is a moral obligation to respect all living things. I argue that there is no such obligation. Taylor presents three basic premises for his position. The first two are shown to be mistaken but not necessary for Taylor's argument. The third, that being a nonsentient teleological centre of life confers moral significance, while necessary, fails to be rationally compelling. I argue: The relevant concept of teleology as readily applies to inanimate objects as it does to nonsentient life forms. The inanimate–nonsentient distinction is founded upon a continuum which offers no basis sufficient to justify The Life Principle. The concept of teleology, as used by Taylor, is too unclear and ill‐founded to serve as the basis for a rationally compelling argument.
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DOI 10.1111/japp.1989.6.issue-2
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Towards a More Expansive Moral Community.Mark Bernstein - 1992 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 9 (1):45-52.

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